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Can comparative statements be credible even when absolute statements are not? For
instance, can a professor credibly rank diﬀerent students for a prospective employer even if
she has an incentive to exaggerate the merits of each student? Or can an analyst credibly
rank diﬀerent stocks even if the client would be dubious about a recommendation to buy
any one of them? We examine such problems in a multidimensional sender-receiver game
where the sender has private information about multiple variables. We show that ordinal
cheap talk, in which the variables are completely ordered by value or grouped into categories
b yv a l u e ,c a nb ec r e d i b l ee v e nw h e ni n t e r e s t sa r et o oo p p o s e dt os u p p o r tc o m m u n i c a t i o n
along any single dimension. Ordinal cheap talk is credible because it reveals both favor-
able and unfavorable information at the same time, thereby precluding any possibility of
exaggeration. The communication gains from ordinal cheap talk can be substantial with
only a couple of dimensions, and the payoﬀs from a complete ordering are asymptotically
equivalent to full revelation as the number of variables becomes large. However, in some
circumstances the sender can do better through a partial ordering that categorizes vari-
ables. Compared to other forms of cheap talk, ordinal cheap talk is exceedingly simple in
that the sender only makes straightforward, comparative statements.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82; D74; D72; C72. Key Words: cheap talk; credibility
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these ideas.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When can costless, unveriﬁable “cheap talk” be credible? When interests coincide there is no
incentive to lie — collision-averse drivers gain nothing from deceptive use of their turn signals.
But when interests are in conﬂict it is unclear how mere cheap talk can be credible. For
instance, a salesperson might want a buyer to believe her product is of superior quality, or a
professor might want to convince an employer that her student is highly qualiﬁed, regardless
of the actual quality of the product or student. In signaling games the costliness of the signal
reduces the incentive to exaggerate, but in cheap talk games the very ease of communication
can make communication useless. When the sender wants the receiver to take a particular
action regardless of their information, such as buy a good or hire a student, any claims become
non-credible and cheap talk breaks down.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) investigate the intermediate case where sender and receiver
interests are not so divergent. In a model that has been applied to a wide range of situations
from announcing monetary policy (Stein, 1989) to making stock recommendations (Morgan and
Stocken, 2003), they assume that a biased expert has private information about the realization
of a random variable that aﬀects what action a decision-maker should take. Remarkably, they
ﬁnd that the expert can often reveal which partition of the space the variable lies in even if
the exact value cannot be credibly revealed. For instance, if a professor has an incentive to
promote a student, the reader of a favorable recommendation letter may doubt the intensity of
the letter’s praise, but still be conﬁdent that a favorable letter indicates the student’s ability is
above some level. But even such “partition cheap talk” breaks down if the professor is willing
to recommend a very bad student.
The Crawford and Sobel model and related cheap talk models generally assume that the
sender has information about only one unknown variable. But in practice the sender may have
information about many variables. For instance, a stock analyst has information about diﬀerent
stocks, a salesperson has information about diﬀerent products, or a professor is in the position
to evaluate multiple students. This paper examines the cheap talk possibilities that arise in
such situations. In particular, we explore the potential for “ordinal cheap talk” regarding the
relative magnitudes of multiple unknown variables, e.g. a professor might indicate that one
student is better than another. Ordinal cheap talk has the potential to be credible because it
simultaneously sends both favorable and unfavorable information about diﬀerent issues. The
ability to exaggerate is thereby eliminated.
1In a multi-dimensional model that encompasses the Crawford and Sobel expert game we
ﬁnd that simple complementarity conditions are suﬃcient for ordinal cheap talk to be an
equilibrium. The conditions ensure that the sender wants the receiver to take a higher action
when the unknown variable is higher, and that the receiver wants to take a higher action when
the unknown variable is expected to be higher. As a result the sender has no incentive to deviate
from the true ranking. Even if the sender always wants the receiver to take a particular action
in each dimension, ordinal cheap talk is credible as long as the complementarity conditions
are satisﬁed. These conditions appear to ﬁt many real world situations and are satisﬁed under
the basic assumptions of the expert game. Whereas Crawford and Sobel show that cheap talk
is only an equilibrium in the expert game if the expert’s and decision-maker’s interests are
suﬃciently aligned, in the multi-dimensional version of the game we ﬁnd that ordinal cheap
talk is always an equilibrium.
The communication gains from ordinal cheap talk can be substantial. As the number of
issues grow, the sender’s ranking becomes a very accurate signal of each variable’s value. For
instance, the smallest of two variables is likely to be below average, but the smallest of 100
variables is not only likely to be below average, but its distribution is heavily concentrated near
the bottom of the original distribution. In general, for any p ∈ (0,1), as the number of issues N
becomes large the pN-th issue is very likely to be very close to the p-th percentile of the original
distribution. As a result, revealing the sender’s comparative information through a complete
ordering is asymptotically equivalent to revealing all of the sender’s private information.
Ordinal cheap talk as we deﬁne it includes both a complete ordering in which all the
variables are ranked, and a partial ordering in which the variables are categorized by relative
size. For instance, a partial ordering could involve dividing students into two groups in which
all members of one group are at least as good as those in another group, but no ﬁner information
is revealed. The same complementarity conditions determine whether a complete ordering or
partial ordering is an equilibrium, but a partial ordering clearly transmits less information if
there are more than two issues.
While the receiver is never worse oﬀ from having more information, partial orderings can
help maintain some ambiguity for the sender and serve as an attractive compromise between
no revelation and a complete ordering. For instance, if there are three students and none are
likely to be hired without additional information from a professor, then a complete ranking
can push the best student over the top. But if the middle student will not quite make it
based on the complete ordering an alternative is to put the top two students in a group and
2not diﬀerentiate between them. The average quality of the top two students might then be
suﬃciently high that both are hired. As the number of students increases, such groupings can
be used more and more eﬀectively to maximize the sender’s payoﬀs.1
With the exception of allowing for multiple dimensions and allowing for divergent interests
between the sender and receiver, we follow the standard assumptions of the Crawford-Sobel
framework. In particular, there is only one sender and one receiver who engage in a one-shot
game, only the receiver takes an action, and the receiver does not have any private information.
Clearly these assumptions do not apply in many situations and they have all been relaxed
within the literature.2 When there are multiple senders, competition between the senders can
lead to more information revelation (Krishna and Morgan, 2001). Battaglini (2002) ﬁnds the
strong result that in a multi-dimensional setting a receiver can structure such competition
to induce full information revelation when the multiple senders have diﬀerent preferences.
Surprisingly, the result still holds when sender and receiver interests are insuﬃciently aligned
to support even partition cheap talk in a single dimension. However, the communication still
depends on some commonality of interests in that the senders do not always want the receiver
to take a particular action, e.g. the maximal or minimal action, regardless of the state.3
The assumption that only the receiver can take actions does not cover coordination games,
such as drivers encountering each other at an intersection, where cheap talk can sometimes
resolve strategic uncertainty over which action each side intends to take (Farrell, 1987; Farrell
and Rabin, 1996). Baliga and Morris (2002) consider coordination games in which, in addition
to the strategic uncertainty, there is one-sided uncertainty about payoﬀs, thereby incorporating
elements of the expert game and the coordination game. For instance, two ﬁrms must each
decide whether to invest in complementary research projects and one company has private
information about the proﬁtability of their own investment. They ﬁnd the strong negative
1It is a common strategy for highly ranked schools to obscure the relative quality of their graduates, either by
grade inﬂation, e.g. Ivy League undergraduate programs, or by withholding grades frome m p l o y e r s ,e . g .s o m e
elite M.B.A. programs. For a related analysis see Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2003).
2Additional assumptions we follow that have been relaxed elsewhere in the literature are that there is only
one stage of cheap talk (Aumann and Hart, 2002; Krishna and Morgan, 2002), that the sender and receiver
are fully rational (Crawford, 2003; Ottaviani and Squintani, 2002), and that there are no third-party receivers
whom the players wish to impress (Groseclose and McCarty, 2001).
3Battaglini deﬁnes sender and receiver preferences on an outcome space where the outcome is the sum of
the state and the receiver’s action. The receiver action that each player prefers varies with the state and in the
same direction across players. We deﬁne preferences on action-state pairs and preferred actions may or may not
vary with the state.
3result that in a binary action game if the informed side always wants the uninformed side to
take a particular action, e.g. wants the other ﬁrm to invest, then no cheap talk of any kind
is possible. Note that this result applies to games in a single dimension. If the two ﬁrms are
considering several diﬀerent projects, it is straightforward to show that ordinal cheap talk can
be used to credibly rank the diﬀerent projects and thereby increase investment eﬃciency. We
will not formally analyze such a model in this paper but rather stick to the Crawford-Sobel
framework in which only the sender takes an action.
Cheap talk with both sender and receiver actions can also be important when actions are se-
quential as in bargaining between an executive and legislature (Matthews, 1989). Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2003) consider a bargaining game in which an oﬀeree ﬁrst indicates the rela-
tive intensity of her preferences regarding two issues, the oﬀerer then proposes concessions on
the two issues, and ﬁnally the oﬀeree accepts or rejects the oﬀers. Credible communication is
possible, but only if the two issues are bundled together in a single oﬀer that must be accepted
or rejected in its entirety.4,5
The assumption of only one, uninformed receiver is clearly inappropriate in many selling
environments.6 Consider a multi-object auction in which an informed seller makes cheap
talk statements about her goods to multiple buyers with private information. If credible,
such revelation of seller information increases expected revenues by narrowing information
diﬀerences among buyers (Milgrom and Weber, 1982), but the seller has an incentive to only
reveal good information or even lie about bad information. Chakraborty, Gupta, and Harbaugh
(2002a and 2002b) show that ordinal cheap talk can be credible in such circumstances.
Finally, the main results of this paper are based on the assumption of a one-shot game since
such a game is least conducive to cheap talk. In a repeated game if the sender is suﬃciently
patient, there is a suﬃciently high probability of continuation, and information is fully revealed
between periods, reputation can support full revelation (Sobel 1985; Stocken, 2000).7 As an
4A p p l i e dt ob a r g a i n i n gb e t w e e na ne x e c u t i v ea n dl e g i s l a t u r e ,t h i sr e s u l ti m p l i e st h a tt h ee x e c u t i v ew i l lm o r e
accurately communicate her preferences when spending bills are required by law to be bundled than when a
line-item veto is possible.
5Note that since the game is still a cheap talk game, the oﬀerer does not pre-commit to a set of oﬀers based
on oﬀeree statements but is free to make any oﬀer. In mechanism design problems, where such commitment
is possible, Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) show in general that linking together multiple problems strictly
increases eﬃciency.
6It is also inappropriate in voting games where each voter may be both a sender and receiver who conveys
her private information to other voters and also listens to other voters (Austen-Smith, 1990).
7The career concerns literature starting with Holmstrom (1982/1999) shows that in some cases a concern for
4extension of the main results of this paper we investigate whether a reputation for honest
ordinal cheap talk is easier to sustain than a reputation for fully revealing information. For
a large number of issues the long-term value of a reputation for honest ordinal statements is
almost the same as the value of a reputation for fully revealing information. But the short-term
gain from lying is always less for ordinal cheap talk. In a game where ordinal cheap talk is
not credible without reputational considerations, we ﬁnd that for a suﬃciently large number
of issues a lower discount rate supports ordinal cheap talk.
In general, ordinal cheap talk has several attractive features for understanding communica-
tion. First, it can be credible when other forms of cheap talk are not. Second, it is exceedingly
simple in that the sender only makes straightforward, comparative statements. Third, it can
reveal a large amount of information even for a limited number of dimensions and, as the
number of dimensions increases, it is asymptotically equivalent to full information revelation.
Finally, it appears to oﬀer insight into the real-world prevalence of comparative statements
(Rubinstein, 1996).
2 The model
We consider a multi-dimensional game in which player S (the sender) possesses private infor-
mation about N ≥ 2d i ﬀerent issues. The sender’s private information about issue k =1 ,...,N
is represented by a random variable θk ∈ Θ where the θk are independently and identically
distributed. We assume that Θ is a compact convex subset of R.L e t θ =( θ1,...,θ N)a n dl e t
F denote the distribution of θk. For simplicity, we assume that F has a positive density f so
that F is invertible.
At the beginning of the game the sender sends a message m from a ﬁnite set M that is
heard by player R (the receiver).8 Subsequently, for each issue k player R chooses an action
ak from a set A that is independent of k. We assume that A is a compact convex subset of R.
Let a =( a1,...,a N) denote the action proﬁle chosen by the receiver.9
The payoﬀ from issue k to player i ∈ {S,R} is given by a function ui : Θ × A → R that
is independent of k. W ea s s u m et h a tui is continuous in each argument, for all i ∈ {S,R}.
reputation can paradoxically distort behavior. Morris (2001) shows that it can distort cheap talk messages.
8The results are robust to allowing diﬀerent receivers for each issue, as long as the sender’s message is a
public message.
9Note that the receiver can take actions independently on each issue. In some cases bundling the issues so
that actions are interdependent can be more eﬃcient as shown in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2003).
5For each θk let a(θk) be the unique maximand of uR(θk,a k) with respect to ak.W e d e n o t e
by Ui(θ,a)t h et o t a lp a y o ﬀ to player i from an action proﬁle a in a state of the world θ, and
assume that it is additive across issues so that Ui(θ,a)=
P
k ui(θk,a k). Notice that the payoﬀs
of either player do not directly depend on the message m that is sent by player S. In other
words, the sender’s message is pure cheap talk.
For any set X let ∆(X) denote the set of probability distributions on X. A strategy for
the sender is a function µ : ΘN → ∆(M) and a strategy for the receiver is a function σ : M →
∆(AN). Beliefs of the receiver over ΘN (inferred from a message m) are given by a function
φ : M → ∆(ΘN). Our equilibrium notion is that of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium.10
Deﬁnition 1 At u p l e(µ,σ,φ) is an equilibrium if:
1. For all θ, µ(m|θ) > 0 ⇒ m ∈ argmaxm0 E[US(θ,a)|θ,m0]
2. For all m, σ(a|m) > 0 ⇒ a ∈ argmaxa0 E[UR(θ,a0)|m]
3. The beliefs φ are derived from µ and F via Bayes’ Rule whenever possible.
We are interested in the possibility of informative cheap talk equilibria where the sender’s
message consists of disclosing a partial or complete order on her private information θ1,...,θ N
about the N issues. Such a message contains information about each issue that is not indepen-
dent of the information it contains about other issues. As we will show below, this implies that
even when there is a strong conﬂict of interest between the sender and receiver with regard to
the optimal action that should be taken on each issue, informative communication will still be
possible. We call such strategies ordinal cheap talk strategies.
Formally, let θi:N indicate the ith smallest realization of the N diﬀerent θk. Let C =
(C1,...,C |C|) denote an ordering of θ1,...,θ N into |C| ≤ N elements or categories such that
category j =1 ,...,|C| contains |Cj| ≥ 1 issues with
P
j |Cj| = N. Thus, the category C1 =
{θ1:N,...,θ |C1|:N} contains the lowest |C1| of the θ’s, the category C2 = {θ|C1|+1:N,...,θ|C1|+|C2|:N}
contains the next set of the |C2| lowest θ’s, and so on. For a ≤ b, a,b ∈ {1,...,N}, let
cj = {a,...,b} denote the set of indices of the elements in the set Cj = {θa:N,...,θ b:N}.
The ordinal cheap talk strategy that corresponds to the ordering C is described as follows.
For each realization of θ, the sender announces that the |c1| issues with the lowest values of θk
10Note that the equilibrium notion states that R’s action has to be optimal given his inference about θ upon
hearing m. This distinguishes the cheap talk model from a screening problem where R ﬁrst commits to a menu
of actions for each message and S chooses among them.
6are in category one, the next |c2| issues are in category two and so on. If there are ties between
some of the θk’s, the sender uniformly randomizes when she sorts those issues into diﬀerent
categories. Consequently, the receiver knows that for issues in higher categories the sender’s
private information has a weakly higher value and cannot distinguish between issues within a
category.
We denote an ordinal cheap talk strategy by the corresponding ordering C which is ﬁxed and
does not depend on the realization of θ.T h eﬁnest possible ordering, C =( {θ1:N},...,{θN:N})
or cj = {j} for all j =1 ,...,N,is when the sender completely orders the N issues. On the other
hand, the coarsest possible ordering, C =( {θ1:N,...,θ N:N})o rc1 = {1,...,N}, corresponds to
an uninformative babbling strategy. It is well known that there always exists an equilibrium
where the sender uses the babbling strategy.
For any candidate equilibrium ordering C, let Fcj:N denote the distribution of θk given
that the sender has announced that it belongs to category j. Note that for the special case
of a complete ordering, this corresponds to standard notation for the distributions of order
statistics. Clearly, for any ordinal cheap talk strategy C, the possible equilibrium beliefs of the





j=1.11 Furthermore, due to the assumed additivity of payoﬀs, note that if an
action proﬁle a =( a1,...,a N) maximizes R’s expected total payoﬀ given a message that the







for each issue k and category j. Note that our assumptions on uR(θk,a k)a n dA imply that the
maximization in (1) has a solution for all j and C. Let acj:N denote this solution.
Our ﬁr s tr e s u l tp r o v i d e ss u ﬃcient conditions for ordinal cheap talk to be an equilibrium.
These complementarity conditions take the form of a single-crossing condition and a super-
modularity condition. We adapt from Athey (2002) the deﬁnitions of these two concepts that
are adequate for our purposes.
Deﬁnition 2 For i ∈ {S,R},
11As is standard in cheap talk games, given any candidate equilibrium ordering C, the possibility of out—
of—equilibrium messages is ruled out by assuming that to each message m ∈ M the receiver ascribes a mean-
ing corresponding to one element of the partition of Θ
N that is generated by C, and forms his beliefs φ(m)
accordingly.
71. ui satisﬁes the single-crossing property if, for all ak >a 0
k, the diﬀerence ui(θk,a k) −
ui(θk,a 0
k) as a function of θk crosses zero at most once and from below.
2. ui satisﬁes supermodularity if, for all ak >a 0
k, the diﬀerence ui(θk,a k) − ui(θk,a 0
k) as a
function of θk is non-decreasing in θk.
When uR satisﬁes the single-crossing property the receiver will take higher actions for issues
announced to be in higher categories. And when uS satisﬁes the supermodularity property the
sender has no incentive to misreport the order. Ordinal cheap talk is therefore an equilibrium.
Note that the single-crossing property is a weaker restriction than supermodularity,12 implying
that supermodularity of both payoﬀ functions is suﬃcient for ordinal cheap talk to be an
equilibrium.
Theorem 1 If uR satisﬁes the single-crossing property and uS is supermodular then every
ordering C is an equilibrium ordering.
Proof. Consider any ordering C and note that for any message that puts issue k in category
Cj, a best-response for R is to choose ak = acj:N, the solution to (1). More generally, for any
announced message corresponding to the ordering C, it is a best-response for R to choose the
action ac1:N for the |c1| issues with the lowest value, the action ac2:N for the next set of |c2|
issues and so on, ﬁnally choosing the action ac|C|:N for the
¯ ¯c|C|
¯ ¯ issues that have the highest
value.
We show now that acj:N is non-decreasing in j. Since uR satisﬁes the single-crossing property
this follows from Athey (2002) as long as the collection {fcj:N}
|C|
j=1 satisﬁes the monotone
likelihood ratio property in j. We prove next that this property holds.
Standard derivations for order statistics imply that, for all h =1 ,...,N and all θk,
fh:N(θk)=
N!
(N − h)!(h − 1)!
F(θk)h−1(1 − F(θk))N−hf(θk). (2)
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12For instance, the function u
R could be locally submodular and still satisfy the single-crossing property.
8Thus, the likelihood ratio
fh:N(θk)
fh:N(θ0
k) is increasing in h for all θk >θ 0
k. Consider now any two




h=a fh:N(θk)a n dfcj0:N(θk)= 1
|cj0|
Pb0
h=a0 fh:N(θk), it is immediate that






























Hence, the collection {fcj:N}
|C|
j=1 satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property in j.
Finally, since uS is supermodular and acj:N is non-decreasing in j, the seller has no incentive
to misreport the correct ordering. To see this, note that for any realization of θ if the sender
announces a lower category for issue θk than for issue θk0 with θk >θ k0, he can do at least weakly
better by switching the announced categories for these two issues, keeping the announced
categories for the other issues ﬁxed. Therefore for every realization of θ the seller can do no
better than to announce that the |c1| issues with the lowest values belong to category 1, the
next |c2| issues to category 2 and so on.13
When ordinal cheap talk is an equilibrium the sender can credibly reveal comparative
information. Even if interests are so divergent that the sender always wants the receiver to
take a particular action in each dimension, comparative information is credible as long as the
complementarity conditions are satisﬁed. Such information can be surprisingly informative.
We ﬁnd that as the number of issues N becomes large, the per-issue expected payoﬀs under
the complete ordering converge to the expected payoﬀs in the full information case.
Theorem 2 Under the complete ordering C =( θ1:N,...,θ N:N), expected sender and receiver
payoﬀs asymptotically approach the full information case as the number of issues N increases.
Proof. For each q ∈ (0,1), by the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley (1995)),
lim
N→∞
θdqNe:N = F−1(q)a . s . ( 4 )
where dxe denotes the smallest integer at least as large as x. It follows that
lim
N→∞
adqNe:N = a(F−1(q)). (5)
13Note that the function u
S need only be supermodular over the restricted domain of actions actually chosen.
Note also that the identical result holds when u
S is submodular (i.e., −u
S is supermodular) and −u
R satisﬁes
the single-crossing condition. In such a case acj:N is non-increasing in j.
9To see this, suppose that (5) does not hold. Fix q. Since the sequence adqNe:N is a se-
quence in a closed set A, it has a convergent subsequence converging to a point in A,s a y ,
a0 6= F−1(q). Since a(F−1(q)) is the unique maximand of uR(a,F−1(q)), it follows that
uR(a(F−1(q)),F−1(q)) >u R(a0,F−1(q)). Then for N large enough, by continuity of uR,
E[uR(a(F−1(q)),θ j:N)] >E [uR(a(θj:N),θ j:N)] a contradiction with the deﬁnition of aj:N. By
continuity of uR and uS (5) implies
lim
N→∞
E[ui(adqNe:N,θ dqNe:N)] = ui(a(F−1(q)),F−1(q)) for all i ∈ {S,R}. (6)
























where the ﬁrst equality is deﬁnitional, the second follows from the boundedness of a continuous
function on a compact domain, the third follows from (6), and the last is again deﬁnitional.
Note that since the receiver can always choose the same actions even when he has more
information, he is necessarily better oﬀ the more information that is revealed. Thus, the
receiver’s ex-ante expected payoﬀ is the highest under the full ordering (and, more generally,
higher the ﬁner is the ordering). The result above shows that asymptotically under the complete
ordering, the receiver is as well oﬀ as he would be under full information.
In a variety of contexts, such as the Crawford-Sobel expert game, the sender is also better
oﬀ from more information being revealed. But fully revealing information is not desirable in
all games. We will consider a game with many applications where the receiver’s incentive to
take a binary action — such as hiring a student or not based on a professor’s recommendation
— induces the sender to prefer a partial ordering. But ﬁrst we consider the multi-dimensional
Crawford-Sobel expert game in more detail.
102.1 Application to Crawford-Sobel expert game
We now show how this model applies to a multi-dimensional version of the Crawford-Sobel
expert game between an informed but biased expert (the sender S) and an uninformed decision-
maker (the receiver R). In many situations, such as cheap talk about how tight a monetary
policy will be pursued, the assumption of a single dimension is appropriate. But in other
situations multiple dimensions of uncertainty may be important. For instance, as Battaglini
(2002) argues, a Congressional committee reports on diﬀerent aspects of a bill to the full
Congress, and it also reports on diﬀerent bills.
We consider a multi-dimensional model which satisﬁes the Crawford-Sobel conditions in
each dimension. For i = R,S and all θk, the utility functions satisfy u1(ak,θ k)=0f o rs o m e
ak and ui
11(ak,θ k) ≤ 0 for all ak and θk, which assures that the expert and the decision-maker
each prefer a unique action for each realization of θk,a n dui
12(ak,θ k) > 0, which assures that
the action is increasing in θk.
We will follow most of the literature in assuming that the payoﬀ functions take the particular
form of quadratic loss functions,
uS(ak,θ k,b)=−(ak − (θk + b))2 (7)
and
uR(ak,θ k)=−(ak − θk)2. (8)
The bias factor b>0 in the expert’s utility function captures the expert’s preference for a
larger action than an informed decision-maker would take. In particular, note that an informed
decision-maker would take action ak(θk)=θk but the expert’s payoﬀ is maximized when the
decision-maker takes action ak(θk)=θk + b.
As a reference point, consider the babbling equilibrium where the decision-maker refuses
to ascribe any meaning to the expert’s message. The decision-maker then chooses ak such that







k − θk)2f(θk)dθk. (9)
Solving,
ak = E[θk]. (10)




−(E[θk] − (θk + b))
2 f(θk)dθk = −Va r[θk] − b2 (11)
11where Va r[θk] is the variance of each θk.
Note that uncertainty over the realization of θk decreases the expert’s payoﬀ.B e f o r e
considering how partition cheap talk can help reduce this problem, we ﬁrst consider ordinal
cheap talk. Since revealing more information isa l w a y si nt h ee x p e r t ’ si n t e r e s t ,w er e s t r i c t
attention to the complete ordering of the diﬀerent θk.I fR believes that variable θk is ranked
as jth smallest then, since cj = {j} in the complete ordering, the decision-maker chooses ak
to be












aj:N = E[θj:N]. (13)
Notice from (7) and (8) that the cross-partials of uR and uS with respect to ak and θk
are positive so both functions are supermodular (Topkis, 1978). From Theorem 1, this is
suﬃcient for revealing the complete ordering to be an equilibrium. The quadratic loss function
implies that the expert would like to minimize the distance between the expert’s ideal point
and the decision maker’s action on each dimension. Because E[θj:N]i si n c r e a s i n gi nj by the
properties of rank order statistics, from (13) the decision-maker’s actions are strictly increasing
in j. Therefore, if the expert follows the ordering, the decision-maker’s actions are increasing
along with the value of θk and the diﬀerence ak − (θk + b) is not too large in any dimension.
If the expert deviated by, for instance, inaccurately ranking one θk higher than another, the
diﬀerence could be reduced in one dimension but the gain would not compensate for the larger
diﬀerence in the other dimension.
Regarding expected payoﬀs, from (11) the expert’s payoﬀ is hurt both by the bias factor b
and by the uncertainty as represented by the variance Va r[θk]. Ordinal cheap talk therefore
raises the expert’s payoﬀ by reducing uncertainty. In the full information case, the decision-
maker knows the exact value of θk and therefore chooses ak = θk, implying that the expert’s
expected utility rises from E[uS]=−Va r[θk]−b2 without any information to E[uS]=−b2 with
full information. For a large number of issues, ordinal cheap talk approximates this full infor-
mation solution in accordance with Theorem 2. Under ordinal cheap talk the per-issue payoﬀ
to the expert is E[uS]= 1
N
PN




goes to zero so E[uS]g o e st o−b2.
12Figure 1: Expected sender per-issue payoﬀs in expert game
T h e s er e s u l t sc a nb ec o m p a r e dw i t hp a r t i t i o ncheap talk in each dimension. In partition
cheap talk the expert states what interval θk lies in among diﬀerent partitions. For instance if
Θ =[ 0 ,1] it may be credible for the expert to state that θk ∈ [0, 1
3]o rθk ∈ (1
3,1]. In general as
the bias b becomes smaller the set of possible partitions increases and as b → 0 the partitions
are so ﬁne that the expert can fully reveal her information. Therefore, for any given number of
issues, the expert’s per-issue expected payoﬀ is higher under partition cheap talk than under
ordinal cheap talk if b is suﬃciently close to 0. But, by Theorem 2, for any given b the expert’s
per-issue expected payoﬀ is higher under ordinal cheap talk than under partition cheap talk
for suﬃciently large N.
To explicitly compare partition cheap talk with ordinal cheap talk, consider the case where
F is the uniform distribution on [0,1]. In this case Crawford and Sobel show that the possible
partitions can be directly solved for as a function of b. For instance, for two partitions, which
is possible for b ≤ 1
4, the expert can indicate whether θk is in the range [0, 1
2 −2b]o r( 1
2 −2b,1],
and for three partitions, which is possible for b ≤ 1
12, the expert can indicate whether θk is in
the range [0, 1
3 − 4b], (1
3 − 4b, 2
3 − 4b], or (2
3 − 4b,1].
Figure 1 compares the maximum per-issue expert payoﬀs from partition cheap talk, ordinal
cheap talk, and full revelation. First considering full revelation, if the bias factor is b = 0 then
expert and decision-maker interests are fully aligned and the informed decision-maker’s choice
13of ak = θk also maximizes expert payoﬀs. In this case it is clearly an equilibrium for the
expert to inform the decision-maker of the exact value of θk.A sb increases for any given θk
the decision-maker’s choice of ak diverges from the expert’s preferred choice so full revelation
is no longer credible. Nevertheless, for small b expert and decision-maker interests are still
partly aligned in that for some realizations of θk the expert prefers a higher choice of ak than
an uninformed decision-maker would choose, and for some realizations the expert prefers a
lower realization. Figure 1 shows that for very small b, partition cheap talk allows the seller
to nearly replicate the gains from full revelation. However as b increases the expert can only
make coarser and coarser statements about the range of θk. For b>1
4 t h eb i a si ss os t r o n gt h a t
the expert is never credible and no partition equilibria exist. In this case the decision-maker
chooses ak = E[θk]s oe x p e r tp a y o ﬀs are the same as they are under babbling.
Whereas partition cheap talk is only an equilibrium for b ≤ 1
4, ordinal cheap talk is always
an equilibrium for any b. For instance, even if b>1, meaning that for any realization of θk the
expert wants the decision-maker to believe θk = 1, the expert can still state the relative sizes
of the diﬀerent θk. The gains from a complete ordering are seen in Figure 1 for the two-issue
and ﬁve-issue cases. Taking the payoﬀ gap between babbling and full revelation as the basis,
about a third of the gap is eliminated for two issues and most of it is eliminated for ﬁve issues.
By Theorem 2, the gap goes to zero asymptotically as the number of issues increases.
An attractive feature of ordinal cheap talk is its simplicity. Regardless of the bias factor,
the distribution of θk, or the number of issues, the expert simply ranks the sizes of θk.F o r
partition cheap talk the problem is more complex since, even for the uniform distribution, both
the number of partitions and their ranges depend on b.
2.2 Application to recommendation game
We now consider a recommendation game where interests diverge more strongly than in the
Crawford-Sobel expert game. The game could apply to many situations but we will refer to
the case of a professor who recommends students for jobs. Student quality θk is known only by
the professor and is distributed uniformly over [0,1]. The employer’s payoﬀ is the net quality
of the student above a cutoﬀ c if the student is hired and zero otherwise, i.e., uR =( θk − c)ak
where c ∈ [0,1] and ak is the probability the student is hired.14,15 The professor’s payoﬀ is
14Because of the cutoﬀ it is always a best response of the employer to choose ak ∈ {0,1}.
15Note that each student can be hired or not independently of the other students - there is no competition
for limited positions. Also note that if student quality is multidimensional there may be room for ordinal cheap
14uS = θkak so the professor receives θk if the student is hired and 0 if the student is not hired.
Since the professor prefers that a student is hired regardless of the student’s quality, the
incentive to exaggerate implies that fully revealing the quality of the students is not credible.16
Similarly, in any one dimension, partition cheap talk is not credible. However, this example
satisﬁes the complementarity conditions of Theorem 1, so ordinal cheap talk is still possible
with multiple students.
If there is only one student the employer hires her if E[θk] ≥ c. For more students, the
decision can depend on cheap talk recommendations. First consider a complete ordering. If
there are multiple students and the professor completely ranks them then a student is hired if
E[θj:N] ≥ c (14)
where E[θj:N]=
j
N+1 given our assumption that θk is distributed uniformly on [0,1].
For instance, if c = 2
3 then if there is only one student she is not hired since E[θk]=1
2 but
if there are two students then E[θ1:2]=1
3 and E[θ2:2]=2
3 so the best one is hired. If there
are enough students it is possible for more of them to make the cutoﬀ. For instance, with ﬁve
students the best student has expected quality of E[θ5:5]=5
6 and the second best student has
expected quality of E[θ4:5]=4
6, so both make the cutoﬀ. As the number of students increases,
the professor’s payoﬀs from disclosing the ranking approach the full revelation case.
While in the expert game full revelation is the best the sender can do, in the recommenda-
tion game the sender can do better. To see this consider a partial ordering where students are
divided into an upper and lower category. Since the employer cannot diﬀerentiate between the
students, the employer will hire all those in the upper category if the expected quality exceeds
c, even though the marginal student in the category might not be hired if the employer could
identify her. The professor will then put as many students into the top category as possible
subject to the condition that their average quality is high enough for employment. If m stu-
dents are in the bottom category and N − m in the top category then the expected quality of
talk regarding the diﬀerent attributes of a single student. This model does not directly apply since there are
not independent actions for each dimension of uncertainty.
16Also because interests are so divergent, the receiver does not beneﬁt from delegating authority to the sender
as in the expert game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Dessein 2002). Note that even when delegation is preferable
in the expert game it may not be feasible, e.g., when the sender is a hypochondriac who knows his ailment(s)
and the receiver is a doctor providing treatment.
15Figure 2: Expected sender per-issue payoﬀs in recommendation game







Again consider the case where c = 2
3. If there are three students and two are placed in
the top category E[θ{2,3}:3]=( 2
4 + 3
4)/2=5
8 which is not quite suﬃcient for the employer to
hire them. However as the number of students increases the ability to place more students









3 so all three are hired. Since E[θk|θk ≥ 1
3]=2
3,
it is not diﬃcult to verify that in the limit, as the number of students increases, two-thirds
of the students can be placed in the top category and so will obtain a job. In contrast,
under full information, in the same limit just one-third of the students will obtain a job.
Thus a partial disclosure of student quality is better for the professor than either revealing
no information, revealing a complete order or, if it were possible, full revelation.17 Figure 2
shows the professor’s payoﬀs from the payoﬀ-maximizing partial ordering, from the complete
17Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2003) consider the strategic use of transcripts by universities and ﬁnd that tran-
scripts might be designed to hide information even when there is competition between universities.
16ordering, and from full revelation (which is not an equilibrium) as a function of the number of
students. The asymptotic payoﬀs per issue are 0 from no information, 5
18 from the complete
ordering and from full revelation, and 4
9 from the optimal partial ordering.
2.3 Application to analyst game
We now consider another example where the expert is extremely biased, i.e., prefers the same
action for every state. Let
uS = w(ak) (16)
for some increasing function w, and
uR = −(θk − ak)2. (17)
One interpretation of this model is the following. The sender is an analyst with private in-
formation θk, the fundamental value of stock k. The variable ak i st h em a r k e tp r i c eo fs t o c k
k. The receiver’s payoﬀ function is chosen to represent in reduced form the eﬃcient market
assumption that the stock price will equal its expected fundamental value, given the analyst’s
message. However, the analyst is biased and prefers each stock price to be as high as possible,
regardless of θ.
It is easy to see in this example that there is no possibility for cheap talk in any one
dimension. However, since uS and uR are both supermodular, Theorem 1 implies every possible
ordering is an equilibrium in spite of the extreme analyst bias. The analyst is indiﬀerent
between lying and telling the truth in any such equilibrium.
From Theorem 2, for the complete ordering, both the sender and receiver payoﬀsw i l l
converge to that under full disclosure as the number of stocks N grows. As discussed above,
the receiver’s ex-ante expected payoﬀ is the highest for the complete ordering. What about
the sender? The ex-ante expected price E[ak], for any stock k,i nany ordinal cheap talk
equilibrium, is equal to E[θk]. Thus, from the sender’s perspective, the ex-ante expected payoﬀ
from the diﬀerent orderings diﬀer only in terms of their eﬀect on the distribution of the stock
price ak,w i t hﬁner orderings corresponding to mean-preserving increases in the spread of the
price distribution. For example, for the babbling equilibrium, ak equals E[θk] with probability
1. On the other hand, for the complete ordering ak equals one of E[θj:N]f o rj =1 ,...,N,
each with probability 1
N. More generally, for any ordering C, ak equals one of E[θcj:N]f o r
j =1 ,...,|C|,e a c hw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y 1
|C|.
17It follows that if w is convex, the analyst obtains a weakly higher payoﬀ from ﬁner orderings
compared to coarser ones, implying that the complete ordering has the weakly highest payoﬀs,
in ex-ante terms. On the other hand if w is concave, the analyst obtains a weakly higher payoﬀ
from coarser orderings compared to ﬁner ones, implying that the babbling equilibrium has the
weakly highest payoﬀs, in ex-ante terms. However, if w is neither concave nor convex then the
analyst may obtain a strictly higher ex-ante expected payoﬀ from a partial ordering compared
to both a complete ordering and babbling.
3R e p u t a t i o n
Reputation is perhaps the most important consideration in any real world communication
game. If the sender is suﬃciently patient in a game with a suﬃciently high probability of
continuing, and information is fully revealed between periods, reputation can support full
revelation (Sobel 1985; Stocken, 2000). The main point of our paper is that ordinal cheap
talk can be credible even without reputational considerations. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to consider whether a reputation for honest ordinal cheap talk is easier to sustain than a
reputation for fully revealing information through cardinal statements.18
There is good reason to suspect that for a large number of issues it is easier to sustain a
reputation for honest ordinal cheap talk. As the number of issues increases, the gains from a
complete ordering are asymptotically equivalent to those of full revelation. Hence the value of
a reputation for honestly ranking the issues is asymptotically equivalent to that for honestly
revealing the absolute values. However, comparing the short term gains of lying, the gains are
less with ordinal cheap talk. The only way to lie is to invert the ranking of the issues which
helps on some dimensions but also hurts on others. Hence there is less incentive to lie than if
the sender could make exaggerated claims about the values for each issue.
To see this formally we consider a slightly modiﬁed version of the recommendation game.
We suppose that the employer’s payoﬀ function is the same,
uR(θk,a k)=( θk − c)ak (18)
where θk,a k ∈ [0,1] and 1 >c>E [θk], but that the professor’s payoﬀ function no longer
satisﬁes the supermodularity condition for existence from Theorem 1. When the condition is
18Note that we will only consider the incentives to reveal ordinal and cardinal information. It may also be
true that it is easier to verify ordinal information.
18satisﬁed ordinal cheap talk is always an equilibrium even in the one-shot game so reputation
is only interesting when it is not satisﬁed. We therefore assume that the professor’s payoﬀ
function is submodular in that the marginal beneﬁt to the professor of the employer’s action
is decreasing in student quality θk. In particular, we assume
uS(θk,a k)=( 1− θk)ak. (19)
For instance, the professor prefers that the worst student gets a job because the other students
have other opportunities. Or, in a diﬀerent context, a salesperson prefers to unload the worst
good on a customer so as to clear out inventory.
We suppose further that this sender-receiver game is played every period without limit.
The time between periods is identical and the professor has some discount factor δ ∈ [0,1]
across periods according to a standard exponential discounting function.19 The professor’s
signals are independent across periods and, as previously, across issues. In between periods
the professor’s actual signals are revealed with certainty but it is not possible to contract on
this information. The employer follows a trigger strategy of acting as if the professor is telling
the truth as long as the professor has not previously lied and acting as if the professor is
babbling if the professor has ever lied previously. Such a trigger strategy by the employer is
most favorable for supporting an equilibrium in which the professor tells the truth.20 Note
that since c>E [θk] the expected payoﬀ of the professor under babbling is equal to 0 as the
employer will set ak =0f o ra l lk.
First consider full revelation. For a realization of signals (θ1,...,θN), the professor can either
report accurately the realization or deviate from it. The maximum gain from deviating occurs
when θk =0f o ra l lk and the professor reports that all students have quality above c. The gain
from deviating then equals N. On the other hand, the per-period beneﬁt from maintaining a
reputation for truthfulness is
N(1 − F(c))(1 − E[θk|θk ≥ c]), (20)
i.e., the number of students times the probability that a student has quality above c (and is
therefore hired) times the expected surplus for the professor given that the student is hired.
19This discount factor can also be interpreted as the probability of the game continuing.
20Note that the sender can lie about cardinal information while still being truthful about ordinal information.
In such a situation the receiver might then believe that the sender will continue to tell the truth about ordinal
information. Such a possibility increases the incentive to deviate from honest revelation of cardinal information.
19Absolute statements are credible if and only if the discounted value of maintaining a reputation
is higher than the one-shot gain from deviation:
δ
1 − δ
N{(1 − F(c))(1 − E[θk|θk ≥ c])} ≥ N. (21)
Now consider a complete ordering. Let xc(N) <Nbe the number of students who are
employed when the professor discloses the complete ordering:
xc(N)=N − min{j|E[θj:N] ≥ c} +1 . (22)
For any realization of signals (θ1,...,θN), the professor can either report the complete ordering
accurately or deviate from it. Due to the submodularity condition, the most proﬁtable devia-
tion is to reverse the ranking of the N students. The maximum gain from such a deviation is
when the worst xc students have quality 0 and the best xc students have quality 1. This results
in a gain of xc when xc ≤ N
2 and of N − xc when xc > N
2 . On the other hand, the per-period
gain from maintaining a reputation for disclosing the complete ordering is
xc(N)(1 − E[θj:N|j ≥ N − xc(N)+1 ] ) . (23)
Thus, providing a complete ordering is credible iﬀ
δ
1 − δ
xc(N)(1− E[θj:N|j ≥ N − xc(N)+1 ] )≥ min{xc(N),N− xc(N)}. (24)
Finally compare the optimal partial ordering for each N. Such an ordering divides the
students into two groups, with xp(N) students in the top group such that all students in the
top group get hired, where





E[θj:N] ≥ c}. (25)
Note that xp(N) ≥ xc(N)f o re a c hN. As for the complete ordering, the maximum gain from
deviation is min{xp,N−xp}. However, the one-period gain from maintaining a reputation for
a partial order is
xp(N)(1 − E[θj:N|j ≥ N − xp(N)+1 ] ) . (26)
Thus, providing the optimal partial ordering is credible iﬀ
δ
1 − δ
xp(N)(1− E[θj:N|j ≥ N − xp(N)+1 ] )≥ min{xp(N),N− xp(N)}. (27)
For each N, let δN
f ,δN
c and δN
p be the lowest values of δ for which, respectively, (21), (24) and
(27) hold. We have the following result.
20Theorem 3 For the recommendation game with submodular payoﬀs, (i) it is easier to sustain
a reputation for the optimal partial ordering than for the complete ordering: δN
p ≤ δN
c for all
N and (ii) for a suﬃciently large number of issues N, it is easier to sustain a reputation for a
complete ordering than for full revelation: there exists N such that for all N>N, δN
c <δ N
f .
Proof. (i) Note that (24) and (27) can be rewritten as
δ
1 − δ











respectively. Since xp(N) ≥ xc(N)f o ra l lN the right-hand side (left-hand side) of the second
inequality above is lower (higher) than the corresponding side of the ﬁrst inequality, so the
result follows.
(ii) Compare (21) and (24). From Theorem 2, in the limit as N →∞the sender payoﬀs
from a complete ordering are the same from full revelation, so that the term inside the braces
on the left-hand side of (24) converges to the corresponding term on the left-hand side of (21).
Since N>x c(N) for all N the result follows.
Consider now the uniform distribution for θk so that c>1
2. If the professor deviates from
the truth then the employer ignores any future statements by the professor and the professor’s
payoﬀ is 0 thereafter. Therefore, for full revelation, the per-period, expected per-student value
of a reputation for truthfulness is
R 1
c (1 − θk)dθk. The gains from deviating are greatest when
θ = 0 in which case the professor can report each θ = 1 and receive a per-issue gain of 1. So









3 − 2c + c2. (31)
For example if c = 2
3 then full revelation is an equilibrium for approximately δ ≥ 0.947.
Consider the complete ordering for the limiting case limiting case where the number of
s t u d e n t sg o e st oi n ﬁnity. In the limit for the complete ordering 1−c proportion of the students
are employed so the most tempting case to lie is when 1 − c proportion of the students are
21Figure 3: Minimum discount factors supporting cheap talk
θk = 0 and another 1 − c proportion are θk = 1, so that the short term per-student gain from











Comparing (31) and (33) the latter is smaller for c<1 so, consistent with Theorem 3(ii),
ordinal cheap talk with a complete ordering is supported by a lower discount rate than full
revelation. In particular, a complete ordering is an equilibrium for δ>6
7 for the example
where c = 2
3.
Finally consider the limiting case when there is a partial ordering with two categories. If
the professor puts a fraction of the students into the top category that is arbitrarily close to
2 − 2c, the expected quality of any student in the top category is greater than c, so that they
are hired. Since c>1
2, the most tempting case to lie is when min{2 − 2c,2c − 1} proportion
of the students are θk =0a n da n o t h e rm i n {2 − 2c,2c − 1} proportion are θk = 1, so that the

















So for the example with c = 2
3, a partial ordering is an equilibrium in the limit for δ<3
5.
Figure 3 shows the minimum discount factors supporting ordinal cheap talk and full rev-
elation for c = 2
3. Even for two students it is much easier to sustain ordinal cheap talk than
full revelation and, consistent with Theorem 3(i), the partial ordering is easier to sustain than
the complete ordering for any number of students. As implied by Theorem 3(i) and 3(ii), in
the limit the partial ordering is the easiest to sustain of all three possibilities. It also has the
highest ex-ante average payoﬀs for the sender.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Natural language is full of simple, comparative statements. Nevertheless, most models of
cheap talk involve relatively complex statements regarding ranges of real numbers or functions
of real numbers. We investigate when the simplest form of comparative statements — ordinal
statements — can be credible and how much information they can reveal. We ﬁnd that simple
complementarity conditions are suﬃcient for ordinal statements to be credible and that these
conditions are satisﬁed in standard cheap talk models even when interests are too opposed to
support cheap talk in a single dimension. We also ﬁnd that the amount of information revealed
by ordinal statements can be considerable.
These results broaden our understanding of how individuals and institutions use cheap
talk. For instance, cheap talk models have been applied extensively to model communication
between the President and Congress over how much spending the President believes to be
appropriate. This model indicates that even if it might be diﬃcult for the President to credibly
communicate the desired overall amount of spending, the President will often be able to credibly
communicate spending priorities for diﬀerent issues. Similarly, cheap talk models have been
used to model communication between Congressional committees and the general Congress.
Even if the committees represent special interests that conﬂict with the interests of the larger
Congress, in many cases the committees will still be able to credibly compare and rank diﬀerent
proposals.
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